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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PATTON LEAVER and MARGE
LEAVER,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

14722

RUTH GROSE,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to enforce restrictive covenants
of a subdivision located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and to enjoin the respondent from utilizing a residence
located in that subdivision as a duplex dwelling.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Subsequent to the filing of the COJ!l>laint and answer
in this action, plaintiff-appellants moved for partial summary
judgment that certain restrictive covenants applicable to the
defendant-respondent's property were enforceable and still in
effect.

(R. p.

17)

After hearing on plaintiff-appellants' motion,
Judge Marcellus K. Snow denied plaintiff-appellants' motion
for partial summary judgment and on July 27, 1976, entered
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an order that the "Building Restrictions of Loganview Subdivision" were not enforceable as to any violation of those
restrictions committed after May 12, 1972.

(R. p. 30)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellants ask that the judgment of the
Lower Court be reversed and this matter remanded with directions
that the restrictive covenants in question in this matter are
in full force and effect and that a trial be held to determine
the merits of the defendant-respondent's defenses raised in
her answer.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants conunenced an action on May 11, 1976, in
the District court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, seeking
to enjoin the use of the property adjacent to their home, and
owned by the respondent, from being utilized as a duplex
dwelling.

Both the residence

of the appellants and that

of the respondent are located within the boundaries of "Logan·
view Subdivision" in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
On May 12, 194 7, "Building Restrictions" restricting
the use of certain properties in Loganview Subdivision to
single-family residences were filed in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder.

Both appellants and respondent

purchased their respective properties subsequent to May 12,
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1947.

Prior to the filing of the appellants' complaint in

the Court below, the respondent commenced alterations upon
her property with the intent to convert and utilize that
dwelling as a duplex.
On July 6, 1976, appellants moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of the enforceability of the
"Building Restrictions".

The District Court denied appellants'

motion for partial summary judgment and entered what constitutes
summary judgment in behalf of the respondent that the restrictions
could not be enforced by the appellants since the actions
complained of occurred after May 12, 1972, (twenty-five years
after the "Building Restrictions" were originally filed) and
that the respondent did not have notice that the restric-tions
were still in full force and effect after May 12, 1972.

(~.

p. 30)

The plaintiff-appellants appeal from the ruling of
Judge Snow upon the grounds that the building restrictions
were properly filed and the defendant-respondent had constructive
notice of those restrictions and that the Lawer Court erred in
ruling the restrictive covenants had expired on May 12, 1972.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOTICE OF THE
COVENANTS RESTRICTING THE USE OF
HER PROPERTY TO A "SINGLE-FAMILY
RESIDENCE".
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The following set of facts is undisputed in this
action:
1.

That restrictive covenants (R. pps. 20-22)

were duly filed in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office
on May 12, 1947.
2.

The real property owned by the appellants and

the respondent were subject to those restrictions at the
time of the filing.

(Plaintiff's Conq:>laint, paragraph 2,

R. p. 2: Defendant's Answer, paragraph 2, R. p. 11)
3.

That the plaintiffs and defendant both acquired

their respective properties subsequent to May 12, 1947.
The statutory provisions that the Lower Court was
required to apply to such facts are found in §57-3-2, Utah
Code Annotated (1953):
Every conveyance, or instrument in
writing affecting real estate,
executed, acknowledged or approved,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, and every
patent to lands within this state
duly executed and verified according
to law, and every judgment, order
or decree of any court of record
in this state, or a copy thereof,
required by law to be recorded in
the Office of the County Recorder
shall, from the time of filing the
same with the Recorder for record,
impart notice to all persons of the
contents thereof: and subsequent
purchasers, mortgagees and lienholders shall be deemed to purchase
and take with notice.
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It was error for the Lower Court to rule that the
respondent had no notice of the provisions of the restrictive
covenants since said notice was imparted by the above-cited
statute to the respondent.
The ultimate issue is not one of notice to the
respondent but whether or not the restrictive covenants at
issue in this action expired on May 27, 1972, or were extended by the terms of those covenants until May 27, 1982.
This issue is treated below.
Point II
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WERE
CREATED FOR AN INITIAL TWENTYFIVE YEAR TERM WHICH ENDED MAY
12, 1972. A MAJORITY OF THE
LANDOWNERS SUBJECT TO THOSE
COVENANTS DID NOT VOTE TO TERMINATE THEM PRIOR TO MAY 12,
19 72, AN.D THE COVENANTS WERE
THEREBY AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED·
FOR TEN YEARS OR UNTIL MAY 12,
1982. ALTERNATIVELY, A TRIAL
SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD TO OBTAIN
EVIDENCE AS TO THE INTENTIONS OF
THE ORIGINAL PARTIES TO THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS.
The validity or enforceability of the substance
of the building restrictions (R. pps. 20-22) are not at issue
in this appeal.

This Court upheld covenants which are exactly

the same as those cited below in the matter of Freeman v. Gee,
18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155 (1967).

The issue before this

-5-
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Court is the time frame that the makers of the restrictive
covenants intended at the time of the filing on May 12, 194?.
The pertinent provisions of the "Building Restrictions'
are:
(i)

Each and every lot above-described
shall be known and is hereby designated as a "Residential Lot" and no
structure shall be erected, altered,
placed or permitted to remain on
any such "Residential Lot" other
than one detached single-family
dwelling not to exceed two stories
in height and a private garage for
no more than (3) automobiles.
(R. p. 20)
(xiii)
All covenants and restrictions
herein stated and set forth shall
run with the land and shall be binding on all the parties and persons
claiming any interest in said residential lots hereinbefore described
or any part thereof until twentyfive (25) years from the date hereof,
at which time the said covenants
and restrictions shall be automatically
extended for successive periods of
ten (10) years unless, by a vote of a
majority of the then owners of said
residential lots, it is agreed to
change the said covenants in whole
or in part. (R. p. 22)
Respondent has admitted in her answer that she
commenced alterations upon her property for the purpose of
utilizing the property as a duplex rental unit.

(R. p. 11)

The respondent, and evidently the District court, relied

on
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r

paragraph (xiv) of the "Building Restrictions"

(R. p. 22)

that the restrictive covenants were not enforceable twentyfi ve years from the date of their recordation.

This paragraph

in no way diminishes or prohibits enforcement of the restrictive
covenants after the initial twenty-five year term.

The

appellants have standing to enforce the restriction on singlefamily residences without an express grant of authority as
is demonstrated by Parrish v. Richards, 8 U.2d 419, 336 P.2d
122 (1959), and Metropolitan Investment Company v. Sine, 14
U.2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962).
The restrictive covenants (R. pps. 20-22) are
absolutely clear.

The initial term was for a period of

twenty-five years (May 27, 1972) and thereafter was automatically extended for a period of ten years unless a vote
of a majority of the owners of the residential lots had
chosen to alter those restrictions.

It is conceded that

no such action has been taken.
Asswning for the moment that an ambiguity does
exist in the covenants, the Court must ascertain the intentions of the original parties to the covenants.
v. Richard,

~·

Parrish

The intention of Richard Hoyt and Maude

Hoyt at the time they executed and filed the "Building Restrictions" (R. pps. 20-22) was to restrict the use of the
property in question to single-family residential use.
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Loganview Subdivision is located immediately west of Foothill
Drive and 2300 East and north of 1700 South in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

Except for the area of Foothill Village to

the north, the area is utilized for residential dwellings,
The covenants clearly express an intention that the owners
of property in Loganview Subdivision retain those many
benefits attendant to family neighborhoods.

The Hoyts did

provide, in paragraph (xiii) of the covenants, that a majority
of the landowners might voluntarily choose to alter the
nature of their neighborhood but that event has not occurred,
The intention of these "Building Restrictions"
(R. pps. 20-22) are further buttressed by paragraph (xv)
which states:
Invalidation of any one of the covenants
and restrictions hereinbefore set forth
by judgment or court order shall in no
wise affect any of the other provisions
hereof which shall remain in full force
and effect until twenty-five years from
the date hereof subject to automatic
extension as provided in paragraph (xiii)
hereof.
The Hoyts envisioned that if any paragraph in the restrictive
covenants was ruled invalid, that the remaining provisions
should remain in full force and effect for the original
twenty-five year term and be automatically extended for tenyear periods in the event the landowners did not act to
remove them.

-8-
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In the rnemorandwn submitted by counsel for the
respondent before the District Court, counsel for the respondent relies on several cases clearly distinguishable to
the action pending here.

In the matter of Eckard v. Smith,

527 P.2d 660 (Utah 1972), the action before the court was one
for specific performance under a first option.

While the

intentions of the parties were important in that matter, the
case was decided upon the issue that the option to sell was
a privilege to be exercised only in the event the seller
desired to convey the real property to the buyer.

In that

action the seller did not choose to convey that property and
therefore specific performance was denied.

In Pitcher v.

Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967), the seller
brought an action for the value of hay removed from his
property and the buyer, in turn, counterclairned for specific
performance of a "contract" to purchase the property.

While

;

an earnest money agreement had been executed, no final contract
had been consummated.

Therefore, the court declined to order

specific performance.

It is submitted that these cases do

not apply to the covenants now before the Court in that these
covenants represent a clear and final expression of the intent
of the original makers.
counsel for respondent also relied upon Parrish v. RichaXdS,
8 U.2d 419, 336 P.2d 122 (1959), (R. p. 26), mich CXlllllSE!l for cg>e].lants

-9-
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has cited earlier in this brief.

In the Parrish action, suit

was brought to enjoin the maintenance of a tennis court as
violating a restrictive covenant against other than singlefamily dwellings.

Counsel for the respondent further set

forth a portion of the Court's opinion in the Parrish action
that this Court found:
The trial court followed the correct
doctrine that in the construction of
uncertain or ambiguous restrictions
the court will resolve all doubts in
favor of the free and unrestricted
use of property • •
336 P.2d 123
(R. p. 26)
What was deleted from the Court' s opinion was the nec_essi ty
to analyze the intention of the parties as to the purpose
of the restrictive coven an ts and the Court, in that portion
of the opinion deleted by counsel for the respondent, went
on to state:
• • • and that it will 'have recourse
to every aid, rule or canon of construction to ascertain the intention
of the parties'. [Citing Reese Howell
Company v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158
Pac. 684, 687 (1916))
The Lower Court further erred in sununarily ruling
that the "Building Restrictions" of Loganview Subdivision
were not enforceable against the respondent since the restrictive covenants can only be ruled a nullity if supported
by clear and convincing evidence.

Metropolitan Investmen!

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

company v. Sine, 14 U.2d 419, 376 P.2d 940 (1962).

The

court must take evidence as to the intentions of the
parties, the purpose of the restriction, and the surrounding
circumstances of the case, which was no.t done.

Metropolitan

Investment Company v. Sine, supra.
CONCLUSION
The respondent had notice, as provided by law, of
the restrictive covenants in effect as to her property in
Loganview Subdivision.

Twenty-five years subsequent to their

filing (May 12, 1972), those restrictions were automatically
extended for a ten-year period (until May 12, 1982) because
a majority of the landowners did not take affirmative action
to alter the character of their neighborhood.

The surplus

paragraph in the restrictive covenants giving a cause of
action to the landowners to enforce the covenants has no
effect of altering substantive restrictions running with the
property in that area.
A trial should be held to determine the intentions
of the parties who originally executed the restrictive covenants,
the purpose of the restrictions, and the attendant circmnstances.
The order of the District Court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

~I~

ROBERT FELTON
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellants
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